Category Archives: Uncategorised

Telstra Cyber Attack Shows How Easy Australia Can Be Taken Offline

A cyber-attack against Telstra’s network that left tens of thousands of homes and businesses without internet is fair to say, a problem for all carriers and the Australian Government, because it shows how quickly Australia could be bought to a shuddering halt by Chinese or Russian hackers running denial of service attacks against Australian IT infrastructure.

Yesterday millions of Australian homes were left without broadband which in turn means no IP security cameras, no smart home technology and no content streaming or accessing the web.

The stark reality is that the next war will be as much a cyber war as it will be a war with bullets and missiles.

Foreign powers such as China will move to quickly knock out our carriers networks exactly as cyber attackers have done yesterday against Telstra, but if it’s war they will also knock out power grids providing them the power to control other essential services.

Globally cyber-attacks are being undertaken by foreign Governments such as China and Russia and violent anarchists who in the US have attempted to bring down Federal Government run operations with Cyber attacks such as the one Australia experienced.

Cyber-attacks such as the one that has bought down Telstra is a straight-out digital attack that hit servers using viruses and hacking attack tools.

In the case of Telstra, they chose to target DNS which stands for Domain Name System this is basically the phonebook of the Internet. Without going into detail you can search the basics of God DNS works via Wikipedia.

Back on point, hackers have bought Telstra and it’s NBN operation to a standstill and that resulted in millions of homes and businesses being cut off instantly.

Cyber criminals which Prime Minister Scott Morrison warned Australians about last month can easily disrupt the vital computer systems of a business or Government with the aim of creating damage, death, and destruction.

Future wars will see hackers using computer code to attack an enemy’s infrastructure, fighting alongside troops using conventional weapons like guns and missiles.

What todays hackers did was penetrate Telstra’s network which in reality should have had some form of protection in place to stop any attacks.

At the least they should have had an early warning detection system to alert of an inbound attack, IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) don’t cost an arm and a leg.

Telstra’s home broadband including NBN services were affected by the outage and it was particularly hard for those Victorian’s who were told the next day that they were set to face stage 4 restrictions due to the COVID-19 epidemic gripping the State.

Why I ask, in the past six months I’ve been witness to multiple advertisements for cyber security related courses and degrees. Some of which are government funded? I ask why are so many companies such as Telstra not prepared for attacks of this nature.

It’s time to wake up Australia.

WTF

Does anyone think running realtime kernels for gameservers is a complete waste of time?

Realtime kernels on x86 is slow, because of interrupt latency 🙁

OSPF + iBGP + eBGP + 2 Switches Failover

This is a rough failover for 2 switches that have 2 links to the same ISP, and they have a xconnect between both. They run OSPF sending out a default route. Switch A is the master and Switch B is the slave. If Switch A’s primary xconnect dies, switch B will announce a default route via iBGP and OSPF to keep traffic flowing to the net.

Switch A:

interface GigabitEthernet0/1
description Primary Internet Link
no switchport
ip address 192.168.0.118 255.255.255.252
no ip redirects
no ip proxy-arp
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/2
description Layer3 To Switch B
no switchport
ip address 192.168.1.253 255.255.255.252
no ip redirects
no ip proxy-arp
ip ospf cost 10
!
router ospf 10
log-adjacency-changes
auto-cost reference-bandwidth 10000
process-min-time percent 10
traffic-share min across-interfaces
redistribute connected metric-type 1 subnets
redistribute static metric-type 1 subnets route-map REDIST-STATIC
network 192.168.1.252 0.0.0.3 area 0
maximum-paths 8
default-information originate metric 10 metric-type 1
!
router bgp 12345
no synchronization
no bgp fast-external-fallover
bgp log-neighbor-changes
network 10.10.10.0 mask 255.255.255.0
neighbor 192.168.0.117 remote-as 1111
neighbor 192.168.0.117 description Primary Internet Link
neighbor 192.168.0.117 version 4
neighbor 192.168.0.117 send-community
neighbor 192.168.0.117 prefix-list default in
neighbor 192.168.0.117 prefix-list aggregate out
neighbor 192.168.1.254 remote-as 12345
neighbor 192.168.1.254 version 4
neighbor 192.168.1.254 next-hop-self
no auto-summary
!

Switch B (backup xconnect):

interface GigabitEthernet0/1
description Layer3 to Switch A
no switchport
ip address 192.168.1.254 255.255.255.252
ip ospf cost 10
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/2
no switchport
ip address 192.168.2.121 255.255.255.252
!
router ospf 10
log-adjacency-changes
auto-cost reference-bandwidth 10000
traffic-share min across-interfaces
redistribute connected metric-type 1 subnets
network 192.168.1.252 0.0.0.3 area 0
maximum-paths 8
default-information originate metric 300 metric-type 1
!
router bgp 12345
no synchronization
no bgp fast-external-fallover
bgp log-neighbor-changes
network 10.10.10.0 mask 255.255.255.0
neighbor 192.168.2.121 remote-as 1111
neighbor 192.168.2.121 prefix-list default in
neighbor 192.168.2.121 prefix-list aggregate out
neighbor 192.168.2.121 route-map backup-in in
neighbor 192.168.2.121 route-map backup-out out
neighbor 192.168.1.253 remote-as 12345
neighbor 192.168.1.253 version 4
neighbor 192.168.1.253 next-hop-self
route-map backup-in permit 10
set local-preference 90
!
route-map backup-out permit 10
match ip address prefix-list aggregate
set metric 10
!
route-map backup-out permit 20
!
ip prefix-list aggregate seq 5 permit 10.10.10.0/24

Switch B:

BGP routing table entry for 0.0.0.0/0, version 2
Paths: (2 available, best #2, table Default-IP-Routing-Table)
Not advertised to any peer
1111
192.168.2.121 from 192.168.2.121 (192.168.5.142)
Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 90, valid, external
1111
192.168.1.253 from 192.168.1.253 (192.168.5.249)
Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 100, valid, internal, best